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Introduction
The global economic situation suddenly worsened in the fall of 2008 
and output expansion was negative almost everywhere for 2009: 3.8% on 
average for the GDP decrease of developed countries. Although there has 
been a moderate recovery since the summer of 2009, for many countries, 
this economic and financial crisis has been the worst and longest since the 
1930s.
Economists  have  been  all  the  more  perplexed  in  that  nothing 
foretold  of  such  events,  as  the  intensity  of  fluctuations  had  been 
decreasing since 1985. Moreover, this was considered to be due to better 
management of economic policies, notably monetary policies.
Along the same lines, fluctuation analysis has shown that most of 
the financial crises and recessions of the past were triggered and worsened 
by inadequate monetary policies. Thus, after having examined the sudden 
speculative rises  and crises since the 18th century,  Charles Kindleberger 
(2005) noted that monetary expansion played a key role in each of the 
bubbles studied: “Money and credit growth have allowed the bubbles to 
accelerate and in many cases have been the original cause of such events.”
Also,  the  analysis  of  American  economic  fluctuations  since  the 
Second World War has highlighted the role that monetary policies play in 
triggering recessions, the worst of which was during the anti-inflationist 
policies put in place in the early 1980s by Paul Volker.
The precedent of the 1930s
Even  if  an  irrelevant  parallel  is  rejected,  as  the  intensity  of  the 
current recession is around one-fourth that of the depression in the 30s in 
countries that were the most effected, from a monetary point of view, it 
could be useful to go back over the main lessons learned during the Great 
Depression.
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Among its remote causes, Friedrich Hayek and the Austrian authors 
point out that the monetary policy and credit conditions had distorted 
market  signs  leading to poor or  excessive  investments.  Their  inevitable 
correction was the cause of the Great Depression. It should be noted that 
then, and now, the inflation index of consumer prices could not indicate 
the  progressive  increase  of  economic  and  financial  risks  linked  to  the 
meltdown to the players or monetary managers.
Christina  Romer  (2009),  the  current  Chair  of  the  Council  of 
Economic Advisers in the Obama administration, underlined the major role 
played by the monetary policy in the Great Depression of 1929 in the 
United  States.  A  misguided  practice,  initiated  by  a  bewildered  Federal 
Reserve, led to a decrease of the monetary mass and deflation between 
1929 and 1933. In France, a persistent attachment to the gold standard 
blocked  growth  of  monetary  mass  and  credits,  thus  provoking  a 
sustainable  slowdown in  the  accumulation  of  capital.  Conversely,  Great 
Britain  extricated  itself  by  renouncing  convertibility  as  early  as  1931, 
therefore  having to undergo only a  slight  and very brief  decline in its 
production.
On the other side of the Great Depression, a similar efficiency can 
also be noted. After 1933, and for three years, the Federal Reserve of the 
United States committed to intensive growth of the monetary mass (+17% 
per  year)  which  helped  push  aside  the  deflationary  tendencies  of  the 
previous  years  (prices  had lowered 25% between 1929 and 1933)  and 
triggered  immense  demand and production expansion.  The first  effects 
were noticeable for operations in capital goods, in the automobile industry 
for example, which benefited from the drop of anticipated real rates. On 
the other hand, the monetary policy, which had become tighter after 1936 
when faced  with  fears  of  unjustified  inflation,  provoked  the  relapse  of 
1937 and 1938.
As  for  the  British,  their  policy  of  “cheap”  money  stimulated  the 
housing industry as early as 1931. Lastly, there was no recovery in France 
until  after  1936  when  government  deficits  were  monetized  and  prices 
started going back up.
The monetary  policy  was  thus  implicated,  first  of  all  through its 
responsibility  in  the  emergence  and  the  seriousness  of  the  Great 
Depression,  secondly  through  its  acknowledged  capacity  to  soften  the 
effects, and finally, through the breaking out of it completely. The lessons 
which the monetary policy makers learned, including those which should 
be made when the nominal interest rates are close to zero, helped them to 
improve  their  results  during  the  current  crisis  on  a  long-term  basis. 
Stephen Cecchetti  (1997) already indicated  that  the central  banks  had 
learned  two  main  lessons  from  the  Great  Depression:  first,  deflation 
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absolutely must be avoided and secondly, they have to play their role of 
lenders with no qualms as a last resort. He emphasized to what point these 
lessons bore their fruit, on the one hand by eradicating the idea of having 
a zero inflation objective, too close to an area where prices drop and on 
the  other  hand,  by  pointing  out  through  a  few  significant  episodes, 
notably  the  Stock  Market  crash  of  1987 and the  “Savings  and  Loans” 
crisis, an unwavering determination to procure liquid assets to the failing 
financial actors. In the contemporary context, these well-learned lessons 
are indeed the basis of efficient reactions noted since the autumn of 2008, 
however they can also explain why the central banks, who have a strong 
capacity  to  manage  a  crisis  once  underway,  show a  certain  amount  of 
negligence prior to the crisis, notably in 2002 and 2005. Moreover, it is 
through what we call the “Greenspan Doctrine” that this type of excessive 
confidence played a part in the outbreak of the crisis.
In  conclusion,  the  renewal  of  a  crisis  situation  in  2007-2008 
undoubtedly showed flagging of central bank vigilance, which was rather 
similar to what had taken place in the years prior to the Great Depression, 
yet he does not question all of the progress that has been made since the 
1930s, from which  the current global economy has benefited.
To come back to our times, after the outbreak of the financial crisis 
and after the recession that followed, it is now time to renew the previous 
sequence of thought through two successive parts.
The monetary policy played a significant role in the development of 
the events through its responsibility in the outbreak of the financial crisis. 
A monetary policy which was too accommodating most probably helped 
create a speculative bubble in the housing sector; this is the topic of the 
first part.
In  the  second  part,  the  consequences  of  the  restrictive  business 
policies since 2005 will be assessed. They have undoubtedly contributed to 
the outbreak and the sinking of the recession into a context of a global 
crisis.
(1) One of the causes of the financial crisis
The monetary  policy,  especially  that  of  the  United  States,  can be 
criticized for having lowered interest rates excessively over a long period 
of time, thus favoring the creation of a housing bubble and weakening its 
own financial system, as well as those of the other countries in the world.
A similar criticism can be made on the concomitant creation of a “climate” 
favorable  to  the  emergence  of  the  speculative  bubble  and  to  the 
development  of  risky  behavior  from  the  financial  players.  One  of  the 
recognized  results  of  the  monetary  policy  is  its  impact  on  players’ 
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anticipation  and  behavior.  The  “Greenspan  Doctrine”  [Alan  Greenspan 
(2002) first, but also Ben Bernanke (2002)] states that the creation of a 
speculative bubble should not be opposed, but that the focus should be on 
mitigating  the  fallout  when  they  burst,  which  probably  encouraged 
excessive risk taking and the feeling of impunity,  according to the well-
known mechanism of “moral hazard”.
The rise of risks: an excessively accommodative policy between 2002 and 
2005
William Niskanen  (2008)  indicates  that  the  financial  crises  (stock 
market  crash  of  1987,  Asian  and  Russian  crises  in  1997  and  1999 
respectively, and finally the events of 2001) have led the Federal Reserve 
to decide to lower rates so as to supply global demand; he observes that 
these successive reactions systematically exceed their goal, thus leading to 
the effect of excessive expansion; this overreaction then obliges the central 
bank to put restrictive policies in place, thus leading to the next recession. 
This scenario can also be applied to the years after 2001!
To measure the extent of the accommodation of the monetary policy 
in place, a comparison will be used between the effective intervention rates 
and  those  from  the  calculation  of  the  standard  Taylor  rule.  This 
comparison is justified by the idea that the latter represent the type of 
efficient and wise policy that would lead to the “Great Moderation” from 
1985  to  2000.  Graph  I,  due  to  William  Poole  (2007),  shows  the  gap 
between the rates; the Federal Reserve intervention rate was very low after 
2001,  which  can  be  justified  by  the  threat  of  the  crisis;  it  is  then 
maintained at this level for too long and with no legitimate reason. In fact, 
the criticism against the easy policy of the Federal Reserve is mostly for 
the  years  2002,  2003,  and  2004.  More  generally,  one  may  call  into 
question its refusal to take the evolution of active prices into account to 
set forth a policy, which was a constant refusal confirmed by Ben Bernanke 
until recent years.
John Taylor (2009) continues this analysis by trying to determine 
what the situation of the American housing market would have been if the 
interest rate of the Central Bank had followed his rule. He asserts that the 
high speculative increase that took place in this market would probably 
not have happened with a tighter monetary policy after 2002.
Moreover,  the  consequence  of  the  decrease  in  interest  rates  prompted 
financial  institutions  to  look  for  more  lucrative  investments  by  taking 
more  risks,  provoking  a  flight  forward  towards  doubtful  and  unclear 
credits.  Their  accumulation  triggered  the financial  crisis.  Indeed,  Roger 
Altman (2009) indicates that the amount of mortgage credits increased 
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six  fold  in  2005  and  2006.  These  doubtful  credits  were  also  granted 
somewhat everywhere.
Graph I   The Greenspan Years : Federal rate and Taylor rate
Caption   Bold line : Federal rate ; Dotted line : Taylor rate calculated by the simple rule
The American monetary policy also has a leading role in world rates 
as some countries have a currency for which the dollar amount is  set; 
they, therefore, set their monetary policy according to the U.S. monetary 
policy.  For other reasons, the European Central Bank and other central 
banks in the world also implicitly follow the American policy.
Graph II European and American intervention rates (1999-2008)
Caption Rus:  American rate (The Federal Reserve) ; Rbce:  European rate (European 
Central Bank)
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Graph  II  illustrates  this  dependency  by  showing  the  respective 
situations of the European and U.S. intervention rates from 1999-2008. 
The conformity  of  the lines  seems significant  and the cross-correlation 
calculation shows that the ECB rates “follow” the American rates with an 
interval of one to three quarters.
Was the European monetary policy too accommodative during the 
time period in question? The question does not hold the same importance 
as it  does  for the United States  as the financial  crisis  did not start  in 
Europe  and  no  one  considers  that  the  European  Central  Bank  is 
significantly  responsible  for  the  financial  cataclysm  of  2007-2008. 
However, a comparison with the Taylor rates could be made. In Graph III, 
the intervention rate of the European Central Bank is lower than the one 
given by the Taylor rule, for the prevailing conditions over the entire Euro 
Zone. The difference is greatly negative over a long period of time, from 
2001 to 2006.
Graph III     ECB rates 1999-2008 and Taylor rates
    (ECB numbers and the author’s calculations)
 
Such a situation certainly derives from that of the United States at the 
same time period; to verify this point, an attempt is made here to explain 
these  European  quarterly  differences  between  the  rates  (RBCE)  and  the 
Taylor  values  by  using  the  Federal  Reserve  rate  (RUS)  as  an  explicative 
variable.
“Taylor Differences”BCE = -2.18  +  0.30 Rus R2 = 0.434
      (-8.47)        (4.50)                               n = 40
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Consequently, the American monetary policy did have an effect in 
the sense given by the theory and could, therefore, explain the weak rates 
between 2001 and 2005. Exchange considerations could also be used to 
justify these differences. To be more moderate, it is not certain that the 
Taylor rule is as good a monetary policy guide outside the United States, 
which leaves a doubt to the excessively accommodative character of EBC 
policy for the Euro Zone. Furthermore, the housing speculation was never 
as significant in the Euro Zone as in the United States.
However, one of the reasons that the European monetary policy can 
be considered as  responsible  for  the housing and financial  crisis  is  the 
laxity it has shown, from necessity, for some countries. Indeed, the Euro 
Zone is  a rather a sundry whole  and the different situations are quite 
contrasted, from inflation risks to production or employment perspectives. 
The national deviations with regard to the Taylor rule are irregular as the 
inflation and “production gap” are different for each country.
Ireland,  Spain,  Greece,  and  the  Netherlands  have  undergone  an 
aggravated housing bubble because the monetary policy that best suited 
them,  calculated  by  the  national  Taylor  rule,  should  have  been  more 
rigorous than the single policy put in place by the European Central Bank. 
These are some of the countries which have been affected the most by the 
economic and financial crisis.
Rudiger Ahrend (2008) tried to generalize this reasoning for all of 
the OECD member countries.  He shows that the accumulated quarterly 
differences  of  the  effective  rates  with  regards  to  the  national  rates 
simulated  by  Taylor  are  correlated  to  mortgage  rates,  to  building 
investments and to housing prices, thus increasing the intensity of housing 
speculation and financial unsteadiness.
Graph  IV  gives  the  different  cases  of  each  of  the  OECD member 
countries  to  which  this  reasoning  can  be  applied  for  the  2002-2006 
period.  It  shows  the  impact  of  the  easy  monetary  policies  (high 
accumulated quarterly differences) on the value of housing investment.
The countries  on the right of the graph are those for which the 
monetary policy has proven the most accommodative over long periods of 
times and due to this,  they are also the ones that have undergone the 
worst housing crisis with the worst threats on their banking system and 
later on public finances.
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Graph IV Housing  investments  and  “Taylor  differences”  2001-2006 
(Source Ahrend)
 
Caption :  Abscissa : Accumulated quarterly “Taylor differences” between 2001 and end of 
2006; Ordinate : housing investment progression for the same period
Furthermore,  the influence of the monetary policy combines with 
that of financial innovations and deregulation to accentuate the associated 
phenomena and risks. Thus, in the British case, the financial innovations 
seem  to  have  been  more  decisive  than  the  monetary  policy  in  the 
progressive creation of the housing bubble. This does not a priori put the 
action of the Bank of England in the clear as it could also be feared that its 
policy  of  targeting  inflation incites  negligence  of  elements  such  as  the 
increase of financial  or housing dangers.  Nonetheless,  Daria Finocchiaro 
and Virginia Queijo Von Heideken (2007) have shown that the Bank of 
England took housing prices into account quickly enough in its reaction. 
Moreover, its rates are high enough during the crucial period (between 4 
and 5%, between 2002 and 2006).
Discussion
The argument presented here, therefore, gives the responsibility of 
the financial crisis largely to the monetary policy, all the while conceding 
that there were other factors. Its adversaries, among the first of which are 
quite naturally the heads of the central banks in question, assert that the 
monetary  policy  is  but  weakly  implicated.  Thus,  Ben  Bernanke  (2010) 
endeavors to minimize its impact through a series of four theoretical and 
empirical propositions. 
He insists first of all on the fact that the “Taylor rule” used as a 
reference for a healthy monetary policy should be of a prospective nature, 
taking  into  account  the  normal  transmission  delays.  Inflation  and  the 
“production  gap”  should  be  apprehended  as  forecasts  (for  a  year  for 
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example)  so  as  to  calculate  the  appropriate  intervention  rate  of  the 
reference.  In this case,  the Taylor differences found between 2002 and 
2006,  all  the  while  negative,  are  the  weakest,  indicating  a  more 
accommodative  policy  than  what  it  seems  according  to  the  standard 
calculations of Taylor which are reproduced in Graph I.
He also claims that  the increase in  the housing speculation dates 
happened before the first “negative Taylor differences” seen after 2002, 
which could clear the monetary policy of suspicion. 
Ben Bernanke also underlines  the diversity  of  national  experience 
and refers to recent works by other IMF teams (Fatas et al. 2009) who 
oppose the conclusions that Rudiger Ahrend has drawn. According to these 
works,  there  was  only  a  weak  econometric  link  between  the  Taylor 
differences and the amount of the housing values over a sample of 20 
industrial countries.
Finally, the President of the Federal Reserve brings the debate back 
to the real origin of low interest rates which incited speculation. Several 
observers insist on the abundance of saving on a global level, the saving 
glut which Ben Bernanke himself made reference to as early as 2005. The 
Asian,  Russian,  and  South  American  financial  crises  of  the  90s  caused 
many emerging countries to renounce international loans and to becoming 
moneylenders on a global scale, which also brings to mind China and other 
oil-producing countries  who wanted to invest  their  large  reserves.  It  is 
possible, even probable, that the United States and other countries having 
an exterior deficit  therefore obtained easy financial  terms at  low rates 
during the related years of 2002-2005. 
However, some of Ben Bernanke’s arguments do not seem absolutely 
convincing.
The Standard Taylor rule, which used contemporary inflation data 
and the production gap, is undoubtedly not the perfect formula to carry 
out a prospective monetary policy,  but it was effectively applied to the 
policies  carried  out  by  the  Federal  Reserve  since  1985  which  brought 
about the “Great Moderation”. Thus, it is not abusive to see it as a sort of 
empirical ideal and to accept it as a reference.
There are also other proofs of monetary laxity during the crucial 
years of 2002-2005, such as the negative value of the real Federal fund 
rates or the high increase in internal nominal demand that could be seen 
in the United States. Lawrence White (2009) indicates that, from a rate of 
3.1% which could be seen in 2001-2002,  the nominal  sales  to national 
buyers progress at a rhythm of 6.7%, and then 7.1% during the following 
years, and did not slow down until after the beginning of 2006. It is this 
same indictor that incited William Niskanen (2008) to use the thesis of 
monetary responsibility. In Graph V, nominal sales give very pronounced 
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fluctuation. After 2002, a great deal of progression of nominal sales can 
be seen, reflecting an easy monetary policy. An action of the same type 
was undertaken in reaction to the bursting of the stock market bubble of 
1987 and yet another after the troubles caused by the Asian crisis, the 
Russian bankruptcy of 1998 and the collapse of the technology bubble of 
1999. Each time, the behavior of the Federal Reserve obeyed the logic of 
the  Greenspan  doctrine  and  each  time  the  excessive  and  drawn  out 
reaction  was  the  cause  of  the  following  financial  bubble.  Thus,  the 
monetary  analysis  carried  out  on  a  theoretical  basis  and  the  different 
indicators of the Taylor rule confirming the indications of the latter thus 
make Ben Bernanke’s defense less compelling.
Graph V Final nominal sales to U.S. national buyers
(Source: Niskanen 2008)
Furthermore, a bubble is obviously not dangerous when it is created. It 
should be admitted that the monetary policy was not responsible from the 
start,  but having fed speculation at a later stage was not innocent and 
even less excusable as the bubble was already visible. Credit gap indicators, 
recently perfected by Claudio Borio and Philip Lowe (2002), showed an 
excess of credit beyond the warning limit of +5% from 2001 for the U.S.A. 
The housing prices certainly began rising before the year 2000, but it was 
only in 2003 that they went over the warning threshold inciting a bubble 
creation – bubble bursting chain [see Bharat Trehan (2009)]. At the time 
that happened, reinforcing an excessively easy monetary policy with the 
disastrous effects of the Greenspan doctrine on the implicit guarantee of 
safety  in  the  case  of  a  crisis  could  but  encourage  financial  actors  and 
borrowers to take exaggerated risks, establishing the illusion that the rise 
in housing prices could last forever.
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Finally, as for the saving glut and by using IMF works, John Taylor 
(2009) points out that beyond the increased imbalance between groups of 
countries  during  this  period,  global  savings  did  not  see  a  significant 
enough progression to be the sole explanation for the low American and 
global interest rates.  Instead, it went down at the end of 2002, before 
picking back up after 2002, however its level never increasing significantly. 
The responsibility of the monetary policy can, therefore, not be removed, 
for the United States or for all of the global economies. This conclusion 
can  be  confirmed  by  a  study  carried  out  by  the  economists  of  the 
Deutsche Bank [Sebastian Becker (2009)] who have pointed out the great 
increase of the global monetary mass, particularly during the years 2001-
2003.
(II) The monetary policy: one of the causes of the recession
When  the  time  came,  the  monetary  policy  was  also  implicated  in  the 
collapse of the housing bubble and banking crisis. As is the case for many 
past  recessions,  it  can,  therefore,  be  blamed  for  triggering  the  global 
recession. In his aforementioned article, William Niskanen (2008) wrote: 
“A  third  lesson  is  that  the  necessary  measures  to  deflate  the  demand 
bubbles caused by overreacting to financial crises should be expected to 
lead to a recession.” When this was written, he was still wondering what 
would happen to the American economy after the monetary stance was 
tightened in 2005…
Tightening of the monetary stance
If you look back over Graph V by Niskenen, you can see the first 
appearance of the Federal Reserve’s tightening monetary stance, which was 
put into place after 2004. The last part of the final demand curve starts 
to decline at the beginning of 2006 and falls below the long-term trend 
line at the beginning of 2008. 
From  2004,  Alan  Greenspan  and  in  2006,  Ben  Bernanke,  his 
successor, stated their concern about the housing bubble and started to 
bring intervention rates back up to slow it down. Convincing results do not 
seem to  have  been  obtained,  at  least  not  in  2005  and  2006  (as  was 
pointed out by Roger Altman). The distribution of rate increases towards 
the longest possible terms seemed painstaking: Alan Greenspan colorfully 
called the phenomenon “conundrum”, thus showing an “abnormal” trend 
toward the lowering of long-term rates. Ben Bernanke polished up his own 
explanation with a global “saving glut” which fueled American mortgage 
loans thus, countering national monetary restrictions. Nonetheless, despite 
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appearances, tightening the monetary stance started off well. However, it 
had a negative influence on the American economy and as a result on the 
global economy, which should be explained beyond “conundrum”: how can 
a  recessionary  impact  of  a  monetary  policy  which  has  proven  to  be 
incapable of raising long-term loan rates be justified. This is what the rate 
gap  theory  and  explicative  analyses  recently  proposed  by  New  York 
economists claim to do.
Forecasting recessions with rate gaps
Tobias  Adrian,  Arturo  Estrella,  and  Hyun  Song  Shin  (2010), 
economists at the New York Federal Reserve Bank, evoke that the rate gap 
forecasts real future activity very well and dominates all other advanced 
economic indicators in this role. 
For their part, David Wheelock and Mark Wohar (2009), who wrote a 
synthesis article on this relationship, point out the more specific utility of 
the  rate  gap  for  foreseeing  recessions,  as  early  as  a  year  before.   A 
recession is all the likelier when the gap between long-term rates (over 10 
years for example) and short-term rates (3 months) tends to decrease or 
invert. Graph VI gives an illustration of this relationship for the United 
States.  Other countries have also been studied with similar results  in a 
whole series of related studies by Wheelock and Wohart. For example, the 
rate gap is particularly useful in forecasting recessions for Germany (for 
France, the number of recessions since the Second World War do not let 
one clearly draw out a link).
Graph VI          “Rate gap” and American recessions
      (Source Wheelock and Wohar)
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Since 1955, 12 recessions have taken place in the United States, each 
of these recessions were preceded by an inversion of the yield curve slope. 
Symmetrically, only one inversion was not followed by a recession, but did 
nonetheless end in a rise in unemployment. To be more precise, Adrian et 
al. (2010) note that one rate gap under the threshold of 93 basis points 
and all the more so in the negative zone, has always heralded a recession 
or a rise in unemployment, in the indicated period.           
What role does the monetary policy play in the inversion and more 
generally in the movement of rate curves? Monetary tightening, which can 
be spotted by the variations of intervention rates, has a very significant 
impact on the rate gap as can be seen in Graph VII, proposed by Adrian et 
al.  (2010).   A  personal  analogous  work  confirms  this  for  France,  an 
indicator country for the Eurozone (Graph VIII).  In both examples, the 
elevation policy of Central  Bank conditions brought about a decrease in 
the rate gap of around one for one in the United States, and a little less 
(slope: -0.82) for France. The simple regression for France, which reached 
an R2 of  0.67,  indicates the role played by the monetary policy in the 
evolution of  the rate  gap between 10-year  loans  and 3-month loans  is 
around two-thirds.        
Graph VII        Federal rate changes and the U.S. rate gap 
                      (Source: Adrian et al.)
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Graph VIII  Central Bank intervention rate movements and the rate gap 
(1995-2009)          
   (ECB and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis numbers: calculations by the author)
Caption : The “Central Bank” is the Banque de France before 1999 and the EBC after .
                                                                                                                
A theory linking the rate gap and the probability of recession
Tobias Adrian, Arturo Estrella, and Hyun Song Shin (2010) offer an 
explanation of why the lowering of the rate gap and its eventual inversion 
bring about a recession and the progression of unemployment. 
The  traditional  logic  underlying  the  monetary  tightening  effects 
represent  an  increase  in  the  short-term  rates  is  the  progressive 
propagation of this increase toward longer-term exchanges. The industrial 
and housing investments respond to this rise of long-term loan conditions 
and  decrease.  The  global  demand  then  reduces,  thus  increasing  the 
probabilities  of  going  into  recession.  This  classical  scenario  includes 
reducing the rate gap at the beginning of the contamination process of 
diverse market segments of loans, however this decrease is temporary and 
stops  after  long-term  rates  finally  adapt.  In  2005,  Alan  Greenspan 
expected things to happen in this way.
Adrian et al.  think that a monetary policy can behave in another 
way. The increase in short-term interest rates seems a threat to them for 
the return on loan operations. The financial intermediaries and the banks 
15
indeed  borrow over  the  short  term and loan over  the  long  term.  The 
decrease of the rate gap is,  therefore,  seen as a narrowing of marginal 
profit  made  on  the  operations  and  incites  different  intermediaries  to 
restrict  their  credit  offers  and  to  increase  their  risk  premiums;  these 
phenomena are, therefore, an impact on global demand and real activity.
Their empirical study first endeavors to show the positive link that 
exists between the rate gap and the net margin of financial intermediaries 
(in practice commercial banks). They conclude by stating the statistically 
significant  character  of  this  link.  Reaching  another level,  they come to 
consider that the interest gap predicts recessions well because it predicts a 
decrease of future return, a decrease of future asset values and a weaker 
value of the net margin on loan operations. 
Conversely,  a  rate  curve  with  a  steep  slope  is  a  promise  of  a  greater 
upturn  as  it  helps  to  restore  the  profitability  of  new  loans  and  thus 
supports  the  rise  of  credits  for  the  real  economy.  This  remark  is 
interesting in two ways: it helps understand how the easy policy of 2002-
2004 could stimulate the rise of credits and the risk taking behavior of the 
financial intermediaries; it also gives some light on the chances of a rapid 
upturn of the global economy after 2009. In fact, the policy set forth by 
the central banks in reaction to the crisis caused a great increase in the 
rate gap as early as the end of 2008. In Graph VI, the last segment of the 
curve representing the rate gap in the United States shows the recorded 
progression. In France, the gap becomes positive again at the beginning of 
2009 (see Graph IX).
Rate gap and monetary tightening
Studying Graph VI confirms the monetary tightening put in place by 
Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke during 2004 and 2006. The rate gap 
decreases and becomes negative at the end of 2006, thus making a slide 
into recession more probable. For the Euro Zone, and more particularly 
for France, the joint movement of short-term and long-term interest rates 
(Graph  IX)  can  be  followed.  Knowing  that  the  former  represent  the 
monetary policy of the European Central Bank rather well, the rate gap 
starts to decrease after 2004 and inverts after mid 2007; it stays in the 
negative zone for about a year and a half.
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Graph IX        Rates and rate gaps: France 1995-2009
                   (Source : FRB St Louis)
 
Both retrospectives unfold identically with a delay (about two quarters 
late)  in  the  case  of  Europe  (France):  a  decrease  in  the  gap  rate 
corresponding to a monetary tightening brought on by an inversion after 
about two and a half years. The economic recession began approximately 
one year after this inversion.
The  rate  gap  forecasting  approach,  being  thus  based  on  the 
theoretical  analysis  of  the  transmission  given  by  economists  and  the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, has thus highlighted how the monetary 
tightening of 2004 could prepare the way for the economic recession of 
2008. The monetary policy is  thus in part responsible,  not only in the 
creation of the housing and financial bubble, but also in the bursting of 
this bubble and the economic recession under the influence of restrictive 
monetary policies  that were then put into place.  The American Central 
Bank was involved in both stages of this scenario, and as for the European 
Central Bank, it was involved in the second stage, with a slight delay.
Moreover,  the  central  banks  were  rather  slow  in  perceiving  the 
danger of the crisis and threats of an economy slowdown. Late in 2008, 
they did not seem resolved to vigorously change their policy to adapt to 
the new perspectives…
17
Approaching the conclusion
According  to  Robert  Hetzel  (2009),  the  collapse  happened in  the 
second and third quarters of 2008. Despite significant deterioration of the 
American economy, the Federal Reserve was satisfied with maintaining its 
intervention  rate  at  2%,  which  was  reached  on  April  30th,  moreover 
allowing anticipation of ulterior recovery from this rate to develop. Even 
before the development of destruction of wealth caused by the decrease of 
stock market values in September, the implicit tightening of the monetary 
policy probably triggered the real beginning of the recession. The sudden 
gas price increase was combined with this more restrictive policy and the 
financial crisis to thus deepen the stronger postwar recession.
The  monetary  policy  carried  out  by  other  large  bodies  (United 
Kingdom, Japan, Euro Zone) is characterized by similar hesitations at the 
same period. The Bank of England maintained its intervention rate at 5% 
during the whole summer of 2008, and only lowered it on October 8th. In 
its defense, it can be said that it no longer had much of a lowering margin 
for the intervention rate that had already been reduced to 0.5%.
Finally, when it comes to the Euro Zone, the decisions are even more 
surprising, the European Central Bank was obviously wrong in its forecasts 
during the first two quarters of 2008. Its monetary policy was explicitly 
tightened until the summer (in July: increase of the intervention rate from 
4 to 4.25%).  Fears  of  even  greater  inflation,  combined with  the  rising 
prices of raw materials and the wage growth in some countries of the zone 
explain this mistake.
Thus, Axel Weber (2008), President of the Bundesbank and probable 
candidate  to  replace  Jean-Claude  Trichet,  declared  at  the  University  of 
Constance as late as June 25, 2008:
“Even though financial stability is of vital interest to the Eurosystem, 
our primary objective  is  the maintenance of price  stability  in the euro 
area.”
As well as, “This confirms that the current upward pressures on the 
euro-area inflation,  which result  largely from sharp increases in energy 
and food prices at the global level, are rather persistent.”
Finally, “Furthermore, economic growth is slowing down on a global 
scale, even though, as far as the euro area is concerned, we do expect it to 
remain robust, but certainly less dynamic in the quarters ahead.”
It can be seen that this  excessive priority given to the inflation of 
consumer prices, the neglect of taking these recessionary aspects of the 
increase in price  of gas and basic  products into account,  and a certain 
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nonchalance toward immediate financial threats have led to this blunder 
by the European Central Bank.
The  ECB  made  up  for  it  at  a  later  date  (October  8th),  but  still 
regretted  its  diagnostic  errors  and  its  lack  of  responsiveness  to  the 
alarming international economic context. It can be all the more regretted 
considering the standard delay of action, such errors have probably had 
repercussions for a rather long period of time afterwards.
For  Robert  Hetzel,  a  bad  monetary  policy,  characterized  by  the 
neglect  of  lowering  rates,  let  alone  their  European  increase,  could  be 
considered  as  the  primary  cause  of  the  extraordinary  decline  of  the 
economic situation in Europe and Japan from the spring and summer of 
2008. The propagation of the slowdown from the moderate recession of 
the American economy does not seem to have played as significant a role. 
However, naturally, this does not mean there was not propagation as far 
as the financial crisis itself is concerned.
Conclusion
All together, the monetary policy, especially the American one, can 
be blamed for the remote role (2002-2004) it played in the creation of 
the speculative bubble which led to a financial crisis. It also has a part of 
the responsibility through its restrictive direction during the 2004-2006 
period; this time, a direction shared by other central banks. Finally, it is 
more  immediately  involved  through  its  lack  of  clear-sightedness  and 
responsiveness in the first months of the recession. However, the way the 
central  banks then dealt with the serious issues that resulted from the 
crisis itself probably does not call for similar criticism…
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